Detecting privacy and ethical sensitivity in data
            mining results by Fule, Peter & Roddick, John Francis
Detecting Privacy and Ethical Sensitivity in Data Mining Results
Peter Fule and John Roddick
School of Informatics and Engineering
Flinders University, GPO Box 2100
Adelaide, South Australia
Email:[roddick, peterf]@infoeng.flinders.edu.au
‘Every art and every inquiry, and similarly
every action and pursuit, is thought to aim
at some good; and for this reason the good
has rightly been declared to be that at which
all things aim. But a certain difference is
found among ends. . . ’
Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea
Abstract
Knowledge discovery allows considerable insight into
data. This brings with it the inherent risk that what
is inferred may be private or ethically sensitive. The
process of generating rules through a mining oper-
ation becomes an ethical issue when the results are
used in decision making processes that effect people,
or when mining customer data unwittingly compro-
mises the privacy of those customers.
Significantly, the sensitivity of a rule may not be
apparent to the miner, particularly since the volume
and diversity of rules can often be large. However,
given the subjective nature of such sensitivity, rather
than prohibit the production of ethically and privacy
sensitive rules, we present here an alerting process
that detects and highlights the sensitivity of the dis-
covered rules. The process caters for differing sensi-
tivities at the attribute value level and allows a variety
of sensitivity combination functions to be employed.
These functions have been tested empirically and the
results of these tests are reported.
Keywords: Data mining, Knowledge Discovery, Pri-
vacy, Ethics, Sensitivity, Association Rules.
1 Introduction
Knowledge discovery, in common with many powerful
technologies, lends itself both to abuse and to great
benefit. Moreover, like many technologies, the ability
to harm or to cause offense can often be inadvertent.
The publication of a rule which subsequently has
a negative impact on the community bears signifi-
cant risks, through litigation, adverse publicity, loss
of reputation and so on. However, the number and
complexity of rules generated from many data mining
systems means that the human post-processing of a
data mining run can be long and potentially complex,
leading to suspect rules being overlooked.
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For example, consider the following (fictional) rule:
PostCode(5409), Age(18− 25), Gender(Male) (1)
→ HepBStatus(Y es) γ(20%)
This would be a worrying rule to discover for any
segment of the population. However, consider the in-
creased risk of offense if Postcode(5409) referred to,
say, an indigenous community or the national parlia-
ment. Moreover, if this rule was a just one amongst
several thousand, it could be difficult for a human
observer to spot the potential problems. Nuances in
specific attribute values, such as in the case here, can
be easily missed without support for detecting privacy
violations and ethically sensitive inferences. Since the
mining process is inherently inductive, many rules
may be overtly generalised (ie. sociological stereotyp-
ical) or may, because of inadequate statistical analysis
and rule pruning, appear to be useful but instead be
misleading.
This paper describes a process for evaluating a
rule in terms of its perceived privacy and ethical sen-
sitivity. As such, these measures provide an addi-
tional way in which to quantify a rule’s interesting-
ness (Freitas 1999, Hilderman & Hamilton 1999, Hil-
derman & Hamilton 2001, Sahar 1999, Silberschatz &
Tuzhilin 1995, Silberschatz & Tuzhilin 1996). Unlike
most other methods which adopt objective statistical
measures to determine interestingness, in this work
we propose a subjective system for rating a rule’s in-
terestingness.
To properly discuss issues of privacy and ethics in
data mining the terms privacy and ethics need to be
clearly defined.
Privacy will be referred to as an individual’s de-
sire and ability to keep certain information about
themselves hidden from others. Defining privacy
in a legal context has historically been a difficult
process which still hampers new privacy laws.
Moreover, as discussed in (Wahlstrom, Roddick,
Sarre, Estivill-Castro & de Vries 2002), complete
privacy is not an inherent part of any society as
participation in a society necessitates communi-
cation and negotiation, which renders absolute
privacy unattainable (Gavison 1984).
Ethics will be referred to as a set of moral princi-
ples or a system of values which guides the be-
haviour of individuals and organisations. It is
the correct way of doing things which as judged
by society and often enforced through law (such
as anti-discrimination legislation). To act ethi-
cally involves acting for the benefit of the com-
munity. It is entirely possible to act unethically
yet legally.
The problems associated with rules such as that
in example (1) affect both parties. For the objects of
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such a rule there can be a negative impact through
stereo-typing and an invasion of privacy. For a pub-
lisher, there is the risk of a loss of reputation and of
litigation.
Two approaches can be taken to mitigate the
effects of ethical compromise. Firstly, privacy-
preservation mechanisms can be put in place that
limit access to data, restrict the scope of queries or
perturb, hide or delete data so that undesired re-
sponses do not occur. Unfortunately, this can also af-
fect the capacity of a mining system to generate ben-
eficial results. The second approach is thus to allow
unrestricted mining but to employ an alerting process
to inform users to the potentially sensitivies of rules,
ie. to manage rather than eliminate the risk. A ma-
jor problem that then needs to be overcome with this
approach is that sensitivity is context dependent and
thus global measures of sensitivity cannot be adopted.
This is the problem tackled by this work.
This paper will discuss, in Section 2, the require-
ments of privacy protection and the enforcement of
ethical principles as they pertain to knowledge dis-
covery activities. The section also canvasses related
research. In Section 3 we outline our process for pro-
viding context-sensitive alerting while in Section 4 we
report on our empirical study relating to their use and
the refinement of the associated sensitivity composi-
tion function (SCF). In Section 5 we outline some
areas for future research and conclude the paper.
2 Discussion and Related Work
2.1 KDD and Ethics
Both inside and outside of the KDD community there
is growing concern regarding the (ab)use of sensi-
tive information (Boyens, Gunther & Teltzrow 2002,
Cavoukian 1998, Clarke 1997, Clarke 1999, Gehrke
2002, Rachels 1975).
Estivill-Castro et al., for example, cite recent sur-
veys about public opinion surrounding personal pri-
vacy which show a raised level of concern about the
use of private information (Estivill-Castro, Brankovic
& Dowe 1999). There is some justification for this
concern – a recent survey in InfoWeek (Wilder &
Soat 2001) found that over 20% of companies store
data on their customers with information about med-
ical profile, a similar amount store customer demo-
graphics with salary and credit information, and over
15% store information about their customers’ legal
history. With this increasing level of storage of per-
sonal information there is a greater risk that mislead-
ing, erroneous or even defamatory rules might be gen-
erated.
To demonstrate the potentially misleading nature
of data mining, Leinweber mined United Nations data
combined with stock market data (Leinweber 1997).
It was found that the best indicator for the S&P 500
Index was the estimated level of butter production in
Bangladesh. It would be obvious that this is a statis-
tical coincidence, but as other correlations are more
difficult to refute, it is important to consider this dif-
ficulty in other situations. The use of more statis-
tically appropriate interestingness measures can help
address this problem. Moreover, the ability to judge
that a generated rule is sensitive is highly dependent
on the knowledge and experience of the domain ex-
pert, rather than the data miner. Since knowledge
discovery techniques are increasing being applied in
areas in which the data miner is unlikely to possess
the required domain knowledge this is becoming an
important aspect.
The first workshop focussing on privacy and data
mining (Clifton & Estivill-Castro 2002) was recently
held in Japan. In common with much research in the
area, the papers on the topic of privacy preservation
in data mining generally focused on issues surround-
ing the sharing of data between organisations or on
mechanisms to prohibit access to data during shar-
ing. The difference in this work is instead to auto-
mate the alerting of users when data mining systems
produce potentially sensitive results (as opposed to ei-
ther screening potentially sensitive data or manually
checking for sensitive rules), and to highlight these
sensitive rules so that they can be reviewed before
use/publication.
In data mining research, particularly in areas such
as medical and health research, there are a consid-
erable number of databases that could be considered
ethically sensitive1. Access to these datasets is usu-
ally tightly controlled with approval for the use of
the data only granted where there is a clear and de-
finable benefit to the research and a strong adherence
to agreed research ethics. The problem for data min-
ing researchers is that investigations using knowledge
discovery tools are commonly open ended – it is not
possible to know what will be found until it is discov-
ered. Moreover, many useful investigations require
the use of non-anonymised data (for example, to link
episodes of treatment). It is hoped that the use of
systems such as that described in this paper will help
with relieving concerns about using data mining on
ethically sensitive datasets and open them up for fur-
ther research.
2.2 Related Work
Until recently, privacy protection and ethical alerting
has received relatively little interest in mainstream
KDD research. However, over the past few years there
has been some important work, some which is dis-
cussed below. The recent concern over homeland de-
fence, for example, has heightened the awareness for
the need to find a balance between protecting the pri-
vacy of individuals and detecting terrorist threats. In
addition, privacy protection for statistical databases
is a related discipline and some of the techniques used
here can be applied generally.
2.2.1 Privacy Preservation
In the literature, there are several situations in which
privacy preservation is required:
• Secure sharing of data between organisations
– Being able to share data for mutual benefit
without compromising competitiveness (Clifton,
Kantarcioglu, Vaidya, Lin & Zhu 2002).
• Confidentialisation of publicly available data –
Ensuring that individuals are not identifiable
from aggregated data and that inferences regard-
ing individuals are disallowed (eg. from govern-
ment census data) (Miller 1991).
• Anonymisation of private data – Individuals and
organisations mutating or randomising informa-
tion to preserve privacy.
• Access control – Privacy preservation has long
been used in general database work to refer to the
unauthorised extraction of data. This meaning
has also been applied to data mining.
A number of techniques have been proposed in-
cluding:
1Our research programme has a focus on the mining of med-
ical and health data as the field presents most dramatically the
ethical dilemmas between the general good and individual privacy
(Roddick, Fule & Graco 2003).
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• Authority control and cryptographic techniques
(Pinkas 2002). Such techniques effectively hide
data from unauthorised access but do not pro-
hibit inappropriate use by authorised (or naive)
users.
• The Anonymisation of the data, in which any
identifying attributes are removed from the
source dataset. A variation on this can be a filter
applied to the ruleset to suppress rules contain-
ing identifying attributes.
• Query restriction, which attempts to detect when
statistical compromise might be possible through
the combination of queries (Miller 1991, Miller &
Seberry 1989).
• Dynamic Sampling and reducing the size of the
available data set. This can be done by selecting
a different set of source tuples for each query.
• Noise addition and data perturbation of individ-
ual entries in such a manner as to retain the ac-
curacy of statistical queries. This can be done in
two ways:
– Noise Addition in which sets of values are
changed such that common statistical and
mining operations yield the same result. For
example, Agrawal and Srikant explore the
feasibility of privacy-preserving data mining
by using techniques to perturb sensitive val-
ues in data (Agrawal & Srikant 2000). Two
techniques are presented:
∗ Value-class membership in which val-
ues for an attribute are partitioned
into a set of disjoint mutually exclusive
classes, and
∗ Value distortion which returns a per-
turbed value. The perturbation is com-
monly a value calculated from either a
uniform or Gaussian random distribu-
tion.
A randomisation technique with a similar
effect is proposed by Evfimievski (2002).
– Data swapping where attribute values are
interchanged in a way that maintains the
results of statistical queries (Evfimievski,
Srikant, Agrawal & Gehrke 2002).
These techniques, combined with sampling, cre-
ate a trade off between accuracy and privacy
• Multiparty Computation. Clifton et al. discuss
four methods in which multiple sites can gen-
erate rules without compromising each site’s
data (Clifton et al. 2002).
2.2.2 Alerting
For all these techniques, the emphasis is on pro-
hibiting the production or viewing of non privacy-
preserving rules.
These measures are not always suited or ade-
quate for data mining techniques. For example, data
anonymisation, while it is often regarded as the first
and most minimal step toward protecting the privacy
of data, often means that the common key is removed
making the linking of cognate databases difficult.
Moreover, there are often ways in which such mecha-
nisms can be circumvented (for example, through in-
specting the results of multiple sessions) and they do
little to protect against naive or unethical uses of the
data. It should be noted that in some circumstances,
such as association rule generation, some aspects of
Diagnosis
Respiratory Cardiac Coronary
Emphysema URTI
PHT HIA
6
4 5 7
2
7 4
Figure 1: Hierarchy of Sensitivity for Diagnosis
anonymisation may not be necessary since the iden-
tifying fields are unique for each object and will not
become a part of the ruleset as they cannot meet the
support constraints.
The technique proposed here is the pragmatic abil-
ity to spot a sensitive rule when it is presented. Once
a rule has been marked as sensitive there will be
application-specific methods for dealing with it in a
way that suits the situation. Instead of a manual
inspection of the ruleset, we propose an automated
process that rates each rule for its sensitivity in the
areas of privacy and ethical compromise. The ap-
proach presented in this paper concentrates on the
privacy and ethical issues of an organisation mining
its own data. As such we aim to provide tools to
alert users to the possibility of an ethical issue rather
than employ filters and other techniques which pro-
hibit the production of such rules. This is particularly
important given our medical domain of application.
3 Process Description
A fundamental problem with determining rule sensi-
tivity is that the sensitivity of particular attributes
are subjective. What may be extremely sensitive to
one person, culture or situation may be less sensitive
in another. In the proposed system we address the
problem of the subjective nature of ethics and pri-
vacy (as well as some of the concerns about the open
ended nature of data mining) by automatically rat-
ing all generated results using user-defined sensitivity
values.
The system works by storing ethical and privacy
sensitivities associated with individual items sepa-
rately to the data mining results. Sensitivities as-
sociated with fields can be created either by someone
with expert knowledge of what is socially acceptable
or through the gathering of societal perceptions using
other means such as surveys. We separate the issues
of privacy and ethical sensitivity because a rule can
be ethically sensitive without being a privacy concern
and vice versa.
The system operates by checking each rule in the
result set against any sensitivities that may be asso-
ciated with the rule’s composite items using a sensi-
tivity combination function or SCF. There are thus
two important aspects to the system – the holding of
item-level sensitivities and the manner in which these
are combined to form a sensitivity rating for a rule.
3.1 Sensitivity Values and Sensitivity
Hierarchies
We store the set of privacy and ethical sensitivity val-
ues for each attribute or attribute value in which we
have a special interest. Assigning values to at at-
tribute value level has the advantage of providing a
more refined way in which to assign ratings. In our
system we arbitrarily used a range 0 . . . 10 with 0 in-
dicating no particular sensitivity.
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These ratings are arranged in a hierarchy of in-
terest (see the example in Figure 1) – a tree based
structure which holds the items with their sensitivity
rating. When the interest value for a particular item
is required, the hierarchy is searched in a bottom-up
manner with the most specialised value being used.
Since most common items can be classified into some
form of hierarchy this approach is widely applicable.
Item-level sensitivities can thus be specified in two
ways.
• Firstly, the system can set sensitivities for groups
of items as non-leaf nodes in the hierarchy. For
example, a rating for
– Diagnosis.Any or
– Diagnosis.Cardiac.Any
can be specified to indicate that Diagnosis or
Cardiac has a sensitivity regardless of its specific
value.
• Secondly, at leaf nodes, we can set sensitivities
for specific values within an attribute. For ex-
ample, a rating for
– Diagnosis.Respiratory.URTI or
– Diagnosis.Cardiac.HIA
can specify elevated or depressed levels of inter-
est.
In our process, different ratings can be given for the
perceived rating of an attribute for privacy and for
ethical sensitivity (or, indeed, for any other subjective
measure of interest). Note that the process degrades
gracefully when not provided with sensitivity values,
ie. no special interest is assigned to any rule.
3.2 Sensitivity Combination Function
A Sensitivity Combination Function (SCF) is used
to calculate a rule’s rating based on each item’s pri-
vacy and ethical values, their position in either the
antecedent or consequent, the number of items in the
itemset, and so on. It can readily be seen that the
manner in which the SCF functions is central to the
item-based ratings being accurately translated into
ratings for the resulting rules.
To test some candidate functions we undertook a
survey2 to determine, first, how people rate individ-
ual items in terms of privacy and ethical sensitivity
and, second, how people then rate a rule that con-
tains these items. Note that we were not interested
in the ratings given to individual items but in how
these item-level ratings translated in the minds of our
participants to those rules they found sensitive. In
particular,
• Is there a simple way in which item-level sen-
sitivities can be mathematically translated to a
rating for a rule? If so, is this formula robust?
• Does the position (ie. in the antecedent or con-
sequent) of an ethically sensitive item in the rule
affect a rule’s rating?
• Does the number of items in the rule affect a
rule’s rating?
• Are their other structural aspects that should be
considered, such as non-leaf values within a hier-
archy?
2FUSA SBS Ethics Committee Approval #2654.
The manner in which item level ratings are com-
bined is a complex issue. In our work thirteen candi-
date functions were considered. We assumed a max-
imum rating of 10 and a minimum of 0. The SCFs
that were tested are :
1. Average :
∑n
i
di
n
2. Antecedents Average :
∑p
i
ai
p
3. Consequents Average :
∑q
i
ci
q
4. Non-zero Average :
∑n
i
di
n−
∑n
i
(di=0)
5. Weighted Average :
∑p
i
ai+2
∑q
i
ci
p+(2q)
6. Weighted Non-zero Average :∑p
i
ai+2
∑q
i
ci
p−
∑p
i
(ai=0)+(2(q−
∑q
i
(ci=0))
7. Heavily Weighted Average : 23
∑p
i
ai
p +
1
3
∑q
i
ci
q
8. Highest Value : Max(di|i ∈ n)
9. Weighted Highest Value :
2
3Max(ai|i ∈ p) + 13Max(si|i ∈ q)
10. Average of Exponentially Shifted Values :∑n
i
d1.1i
1.259
11. Average Increased by Count of Antecedents < 2
: Min(10, 10+p12
∑n
i
di
n )
12. Average Decreased by Count of Antecedents > 3
: Min(10, 1310+p
∑n
i
di
n )
13. Random : random value ∈ 0 . . . 10
Where p is the number of antecedents, q the num-
ber of consequents, n = p + q. ai is the item rating
for the ith antecedent, ci is the item rating for the ith
consequent and di is the item rating for the ith item
in the rule.
The weighted SCFs (numbers 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and
9) were used to test if either the antecedents or con-
sequents are more important for judging sensitivity.
The hypothesis was that one might be emphasized
more heavily than the other due in a person’s judg-
ment of the sensitivity of the rule. SCFs 11 and 12
explored the effect of the rule item count. The hy-
pothesis here was that longer rules would be more
sensitive because they are more specific or specialised.
The highest value SCFs (7, 8 and 9) explored the hy-
pothesis that emphasizing items with higher rating
may be a good model. The random value algorithm
was included as a base reference.
For example, a rule A,B → C with A, B and C,
having sensitivity ratings of 3, 5 and 7 respectively,
would yield a rule rating of 7 if the Highest Value
SCF was used, 4 for Antecedents Average and so on.
The results of the experiments done using the data
collected in the survey are given in Section 4.
3.3 The Process
The process can be implemented to function in one
of the following stages of the data mining process:
• As a part of the itemset generation algorithm.
This allows, in some cases, the use of the sensi-
tivity rating to prune the itemsets,
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• As part of rule generation. Rules can be tested
against a maximum sensitivity and pruned ac-
cordingly,
• In post processing. Filtering or visualising the
sensitivity of rules after they have been created.
This allows different users to have either a re-
stricted or unrestricted view of the rules.
Each of these integrates, to differing extents, the
process of assessing sensitivity more tightly into the
process of generating the rules. It should be noted
that at present the only options are either to forbid
the use of an attribute before data mining occurs (the
option often adopted by ethics committees) or to im-
pose post-rule generation methods such as those de-
scribed in Section 2.2.
The use of the SCF in the itemset generation is
similar to the manner in which the support value for
an itemset is calculated. During itemset generation,
if the itemset’s interestingness rating is above some
user-specified threshold the itemset could be culled
(as with itemsets with low support). In practice, to
be able to function in this role the generating function
would need to monotonically increase as the item-
set grows and thus is dependent on the SCF function
used. In our experiments, the best performing SCF
was non-monotonic.
Integrating the function into the rule generation
stage ensures that rules that are above the thresh-
old value are never created. A major drawback to
this implementation is the limitation of the allowable
functions. Integration of the SCF at the rule genera-
tion phase operates by accepting a set of itemsets and
assigning a rating for each of the rules created from
them. Rules can then be filtered or flagged as ap-
propriate. Using the system at this stage gives some
flexibility to the generating function used, allowing
non-monotonic functions to be used but does not al-
low sensitivity ratings to influence itemset support
thresholds.
Using the system as a post processor involves tak-
ing rules already created and rating them using the
SCF. Note that interestingness measures might com-
bine statistical thresholds and the supplied subjective
ratings. At this stage, however, it is not possible to do
this for rules which lay outside the supplied thresh-
olds and which have thus already been culled.
One drawback to using the system at the post
processor stage is that the rules have already been
generated. As discussed elsewhere (Wahlstrom &
Roddick 2001), once information has been revealed
it is difficult to hide. However, the system can have a
legitimate role as a guide to help data miners assess
the sensitivity of their findings.
In our experimentation we found that using the
system to generate rules from itemsets provided the
best balance between the three options. Rules that
are deemed too sensitive can be set to not be revealed
which reduces the risk of revealing sensitive informa-
tion while the confidence thresholds can be influenced
by the sensitivity ratings. In addition, the list of
itemsets is complete, which reduces the risk of losing
important information through premature pruning of
itemsets. Finally, the itemsets used for input do not
reveal as much information as rules, which gives this
method some security over the post processor imple-
mentation.
3.4 Visualisation Tools
Once the potentially sensitive rules have been found
it is important to appropriately pass these alerts to
the user. In common with the findings of many re-
searchers (Ceglar, Roddick & Calder 2003), we have
found that simply adding the sensitivity rating to a
text based list of the discovered rules is inadequate.
The final stage of the process is thus to provide an
easy to use visualisation tool which, inter alia, high-
lights these ratings.
The ISetNav tool (shown in Figure 2) is one such
implementation. A full discussion of the tool is tan-
gential to this paper but in common with many rule
and itemset visualisers, it uses colour to highlight in-
teresting aspects of an itemset/rule which, in the case
of ISetNav, includes sensitivity ratings.
4 Experiments and Results
A survey instrument was developed to determine the
appropriate SCF3. The performance of each SCF was
evaluated by the extent to which the predicted re-
sults from the generation function, using as input the
item-level sensitivities provided by each respondent,
correlated with the selected rule-level rating given by
that respondent in the survey.
The survey was constructed to test a range of is-
sues and topics and thus aimed to provoke the best
range of reactions. Rules were carefully constructed
to test our hypotheses on rule structure: groups of
rules created from the same itemset, rules with only a
single item difference and rules with (expected) highly
sensitive antecedent and (expected) low sensitivity
consequents.
The performance of each algorithm is shown in
Figure 3. An analysis of the results showed that the
differences between the performance of the different
SCFs was statistically significant. Figure 3 displays
the three measures used to test the suitability of each
SCF. The false negative response shows the extent to
which an SCF under-reported the sensitivity of a rule
as compared to the observed response. Conversely,
false positives measure the over-reporting of the sen-
sitivity. These two measures are important for judg-
ing how often an SCF will miss sensitive rules or give
false alerts.
In addition to the measures shown in Figure 3,
the number of times that each SCF predicted a result
that was within ±1 of the observed result was also
recorded. This measured whether the SCF accurately
predicts the result, without emphasizing the severity
of incorrect results. The results were interesting in
that several of the SCF’s that performed poorly in the
average and error measures performed considerably
better in this measure.
As always, it is difficult to simulate human behav-
ior. We tend not to be exact in our responses, espe-
cially in areas such as privacy which can impinge on
many aspects of our higher reasoning. In fact many
respondents expressed difficulties in giving numerical
responses to the survey. However, notwithstanding
these comments, the results shown indicate that an
SCF can be useful.
Despite the complexity of some of the algorithms,
analysis of the results indicated that using the Non-
zero Average algorithm provided the most accurate
model of human behavior from the algorithms tested.
Figure 3 shows that it provides the best average de-
viation from the observed results and provides an ac-
ceptable false negative rate. The results also show
that both Antecedent Average and Consequent Av-
erage performed more poorly than straight Average
indicating that all items play a role in a user’s per-
ception of sensitivity.
3The survey was given to academics of all disciplines, mem-
bers of industry and lay-people. The demographics of the survey
respondents was spread fairly evenly for gender and age. Most
respondents were Australian (of varying ethnic backgrounds).
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Figure 2: ISetNav Rule Visualisation Software
5 Conclusion
There are currently no systems, that the authors are
aware of, that is available to data miners who are
concerned about the potential sensitivity of the in-
formation that they are extracting from a database.
The system described here provides a partial solution
by addressing the issues of stereo-typing, privacy pro-
tection and the use of ethically sensitive data in an
informed knowledge discovery environment. It does
this by empowering the users with alerts which can be
accepted or dismissed by the user as appropriate. Ie.
it allows the user to better manage the risk presented
by sensitive rules.
While the paper outlines our empirical testing of
the Sensitivity Combination Function, further work in
this area could include some refinement of the SCF.
It has also been suggested that such alert functions
could be used in other contexts in which subjective
measures of interestingness are required, such as in
a homeland security context by deliberately encoding
as sensitive, the characteristics which are of most in-
terest. This, too, is the subject of further research.
Further work may also include application of the sys-
tem in other domains.
If decisions and actions in our society were carried
out ethically in all cases there would be little need for
individual privacy and most processes would happen
in an appropriate manner. However, even if the aim
is to abide by accepted ethical principles, any sen-
sitivities embedded in the data might be overlooked
resulting in an inadvertent compromise of these prin-
ciples.
The value of data mining to organisations is con-
siderable but such benefits can be negated if the re-
sults of the process are abused. We hope that systems
such as the one described here can assist in avoiding
at least inadvertent misuse.
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